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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1971 the Shoreline Management Act (SMA)' has been the
dominant legal tool for managing the Washington coastal zone. How-
ever, use of state-owned beds of navigable fresh and salt waters2 be-
low low tide or the low-water line is still controlled largely by the har-
bor line system established in the 1889 state constitution. 3 Almost no
attention has been paid to the harbor line system in the legal
literature,4 or to its relationship to the other laws concerned with
coastal zone management. This article briefly analyzes the relation-
ship of the harbor line system to the SMA, to the various federal laws
concerned with the coastal zone, and to the public trust doctrine, and
then describes the origin, development, and operation of the system in
Washington.
I. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976).
2. The term "navigable waters" has many definitions. We are here concerned with
the test of navigability used in connection with the equal footing doctrine under which
each state automatically acquired the title to the beds of "navigable" waters within their
borders at statehood, unless these lands had previously been expressly conveyed away
by the federal government. Two authors have summarized the test of navigability for ti-
tle as follows:
There are four criteria for navigability for title:
(1) Navigability for title is determined as of the date each state came into the
Union.
(2) Such navigability is determined by the natural and ordinary condition of the
water at that time, not whether it could be made navigable by artificial improve-
ments. However, the fact that rapids, rocks, or other obstructions make navigation
difficult will not destroy title navigability so long as the waters were usable for a
significant portion of the time.
(3) Navigability in intrastate commerce is all that is required, not usability in inter-
state commerce.
(4) The waters must be usable by the "customary modes of trade or travel on wa-
ter." This may include waters usable for commercial log floating. This includes
waters as little as three or four feet deep that are geographically located so they
have been, or can be used by canoes and rowboats for commercial trade and travel
(fur traders' canoes). This does not include waters which are difficult to access be-
cause of surrounding mud flats or the like, and which are geographically isolated
from habitation and transportation routes, and which have never been and are not
likely to be used for commercial trade or travel. This probably does not include
waters that are geographically isolated from habitation and transportation routes
and which have never been and are not likely to be used for commercial trade or
travel, even though these waters are deep enough and large enough to float com-
mercial type vessels, and are not physically inaccessible because of mud flats or the
like.
Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds in Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 24-25 (1967).
3. WASH. CONsT. art. 15 (1889, amended 1932).
4. No articles analyzing the state harbor line system have been found in any of the
three law reviews published in the state, Washington Law Review, Gonzaga Law Re-
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II. LAWS GOVERNING SHORELINE AND TIDELAND
MANAGEMENT OTHER THAN THE HARBOR LINE
SYSTEM
In the past fifteen years Congress, the state legislature, and the
courts have aggressively attacked the problem of controlling uses of
navigable waters and beds in Washington. Generally, these laws and
court decisions have (1) preserved water surfaces and beds for water-
related uses by curbing the filling and construction that formerly were
prevalent on privately owned beds, (2) protected and enhanced the
environmental and aesthetic qualities of these areas, (3) developed
priorities for future uses, and (4) established governmental regulatory
systems for controlling development and activities. A brief review of
these recent laws and court decisions is essential in order to under-
stand the role that the harbor line system plays in the overall frame-
work of coastal zone management.
A. Coastal Zoning Under Washington's Shoreline Management Act
In 1968 the Washington Supreme Court in Bach v. Sarich,5 barred
nonwater-related uses of nonnavigable lakes. The next year, in Wil-
bour v. Gallagher,6 the court extended its protection of water-related
values to navigable waters. The Wilbour court explicitly affirmed a
broad public right of navigation in the navigable waters of the state
and essentially prohibited any further fills or construction in those
waters unless either the local or state government explicitly and affir-
view, or University of Puget Sound Law Review. Because of this paucity of literature
on the subject, the legislature directed the Attorney General, the Department of Ecol-
ogy, and the Harbor Line Commission to undertake a joint study of the locations, uses,
and activities relating to the shorelines of cities and towns of the state and to cover the
following:
(1) Events leading to the establishment of the various harbor lines pertaining to
cities of the state,
(2) The location of all such harbor lines,
(3) The authority for establishment and criteria used in location of the same,
(4) Present activities and uses made within harbors and their relationship to har-
bor lines,
(5) Legal aspects pertaining to any uncertainty and inconsistency, and
(6) The relationship of federal, state, and local governments to regulation of uses
and activities pertaining to the area of study.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.330 (1976). Pursuant to this mandate the 1972 Harbor Area
Study was completed. HARBOR LINE COMM'N, ATT'Y GENERAL, & DEP'T OF ECOLOGY,
1972 HARBOR AREA STUDY, A REPORT TO THE 43D LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASH-
INGTON (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 HARBOR AREA STUDY].
5. 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
6. 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
278
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matively authorized such action. 7 Filling and construction came to a
sudden halt after Wilbour until 1971 when the state legislature en-
acted the Shoreline Management Act,8 initiating the first and most
comprehensive statewide shoreline management program in the na-
tion.
To a large extent, the SMA supersedes the harbor line system. The
harbor line system is constitutional in origin and dates from 1889
with an important amendment in 1932. 9 Various statutes have been
enacted over the years implementing this constitutional system.10 In
7. For a thorough analysis of Wilbour v. Gallagher see Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill
Public Waters Without Public Permission- Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45
WASH. L. REV. 65 (1970) and Rauscher, The Lake Chelan Case-Another View, 45
WASH. L. REV. 523 (1970).
8. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, ch. 286, 1971 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 1496
(1971) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976)). For an indepth analysis of the
Act see Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REV.
423 (1974).
9. WASH. CONST. art. 15 (1889, amended 1932, amend. 15). Article 15 now pro-
vides:
§ I HARBOR LINE COMMISSION AND RESTRAINT ON DISPOSI-
TION. The legislature shall provide for the appointment of a commission whose
duty it shall be to locate and establish harbor lines in the navigable waters of all
harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets of this state, wherever such navigable waters lie
within or in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within one mile thereof on
either side. Any harbor line so located or established may thereafter be changed, re-
located or reestablished by the commission pursuant to such provision as may be
made therefor by the legislature. The state shall never give, sell, or lease to any pri-
vate person, corporation, or association any rights whatever in the waters beyond
such harbor lines, nor shall any of the area lying between any harbor line and the
line of ordinary high water, and within not less than fifty feet nor more than two
thousand feet of such harbor line (as the commission shall determine) be sold or
granted by the state, nor its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area
shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of
navigation and commerce.
§ 2 LEASING AND MAINTENANCE OF WHARVES, DOCKS, ETC.
The legislature shall provide general laws for the leasing of the right to build and
maintain wharves, docks and other structures, upon the areas mentioned in section
one of this article, but no lease shall be made for any term longer than thirty years,
or the legislature may provide by general laws for the building and maintaining
upon such area wharves, docks, and other structures.
§ 3 EXTENSION OF STREETS OVER TIDE LANDS. Municipal corpo-
rations shall have the right to extend their streets over intervening tide lands to and
across the area reserved as herein provided.
WASH. CONST. art. 15.
10. Only a few statutes have ever been enacted dealing explicitly with implementa-
tion of the constitutional harbor line system. Current statutes include sections 79.01.008
("Outer harbor line"), 79.01.012 ("Harbor area"), 79.01.016 ("Inner harbor line"), 79.-
01.044 ("Harbor line commission"), 79.01.420 ("Harbor lines and areas to be
established"), 79.01.424 ("Relocation of inner harbor line"), and 79.16.440 ("Excava-
tion of waterways through state lands-Requisites of excavation contract"). WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 79.01.008-.016, .044; .420, .424,.16.440 (1976).
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the late 1960's the citizens of the state became concerned that the har-
bor line system and complementary statutes were inadequate to pro-
tect the shoreline against piecemeal encroachment by industries,
housing developers, businesses, and other competitors.1 In response
to these concerns, the legislature enacted the SMA in 1971.12
Under the SMA, local governments are directed to create local
master programs zoning shorelands, tidelands, wetlands, and property
200 feet inland from these areas along the coast and most freshwater
lakes and streams.' 3 The local programs must be consistent with De-
partment of Ecology (DOE) guidelines. 14 After approval from the
DOE, the programs constitute use regulations for the various state
shorelines.' 5 Most substantial development' 6 on the shorelines, except
single family residences which are expressly exempted, is not allowed
11. Developers also wanted an administrative system for the issuance of permits for
shoreline development. Under Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232
(1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970), such permits were necessary before any devel-
opment could commence. Thus, environmentalists and developers both wanted some
kind of permit system. Needless to say, these groups sought substantially different crite-
ria for the issuance of development permits. The resultant political struggle eventually
produced the Shoreline Management Act.
12. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, ch. 286, 1971 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess.
1496 (1971) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976)). For a discussion of the
background of the SMA, and the policies expressed in it see Crooks, supra note 8.
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(l)(c)-(f), .080 (1976). Shorelines of the state in-
clude all major water areas, their associated wetlands, and the lands underlying them.
They are divided into "shorelines" and "shorelines of statewide significance."
14. Id. § 90.58.080(2). These guidelines are found at WASH. ADMIN. CODE
ch. 173-16(1977).
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.090-.100 (1976).
16. "Development" is defined as
a use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of structures; dredging;
drilling; dumping; filling; removal of any sand, gravel or minerals; bulkheading;
driving of piling; placing of obstructions; or any project of a permanent or tempo-
rary nature which interferes with the normal public use of the surface of the waters
overlying lands subject to this chapter at any state of water level.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(d) (1976). "Substantial development" is defined as
any development of which the total cost or fair market value exceeds one thousand
dollars, or any development which materially interferes with the normal public use
of the water or shorelines of the state; except that the following shall not be consid-
ered substantial developments for the purpose of this chapter:
(i) Normal maintenance or repair of existing structures or developments includ-
ing damage by accident, fire or elements;
(ii) Construction of the normal protective bulkhead common to single family
residences;
(iii) Emergency construction . . .
(v) Construction on wetlands by an owner, lessee or contract purchaser of a
single family residence for his own use or for the use of his family.
Id. § 90.58.030(3)(e).
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until a permit has been issued by the appropriate local government
consistent with the local program and state law.' 7 Although the SMA
gives local governments authority to regulate the water column and
bed use beyond low tide or low water, only a few local governments
have seriously tried to do so to date.' 8 The management of this impor-
tant area is presently left essentially to the harbor line system.
The version of the SMA initially passed by the Legislature con-
tained a clause which would have excluded local governments from
any role in managing state-owned land.19 This clause was vetoed by
the Governor, however, and the Act consequently does not distinguish
between state-owned land and other land.2 0
No Washington appellate case has expressly decided which law
controls when the SMA conflicts with a statute implementing the har-
bor line system. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that the SMA
should control in such a situation because it is more recently enacted
and more comprehensive. Given a direct conflict with the constitu-
tional provisions concerning the harbor line system,21 the SMA would
not control. To some extent, however, the courts could avoid a direct
conflict by interpreting constitutional terms, such as "navigation" and
17. Id. § 90.58.140 (Supp. 1977).
18. The fifteen coastal counties in Washington have all submitted local master pro-
grams for approval by the DOE. Only four or five of these programs have dealt at all
with the water column or bed below low tide line, and their treatment can best be char-
acterized as meager and unsophisticated. Of the city master programs, only Seattle's
deals seriously with this area. Telephone conversation with D. Rodney Mack, Ass't Di-
rector, Dep't of Ecology, Jan. 18, 1979. Such inadequate treatment of the water column
and coastal beds has been typical of state coastal zone management programs through-
out the nation. Delogu, Land Use Control Principles Applied to Offshore Coastal Wa-
ters, 59 Ky. LJ. 606 (1971). In an attempt to rectify this deficiency in Washington, the
Department of Ecology recently contracted for and received a study to assist local
governments. Shapiro & Assoc., Manual for Management of the Coastal Aquatic Area
(June 1977) (prepared for the Dep't of Ecology).
19. For state-owned land, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) would have
been given the same authority that local governments exercise with respect to land not
owned by the state. Thus, both the DOE and the DNR would have had powers under the
SMA to manage state-owned land. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, ch. 286, § 3,
1971 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1496 (1971).
20. Parts of the Governor's explanation of the partial veto are reproduced in 1971
Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1515 (1971).
21. We are not aware of any direct conflict between the harbor line system and the
SMA. In State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913), the court said that the
area lying inside the "inner harbor line, being, whether submerged or not, theoretically
nonnavigable, is treated as land, not water." Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037. Until enactment
of the SMA this language was thought to confirm a right in the upland owner to fill out
to the inner harbor-line. However, to the extent such a right may have existed in the past
it would now seem clearly subject to the zoning and permitting requirements of the
SMA.
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"commerce," in harmony with policies expressed in the SMA. Be-
cause the SMA reflects contemporary priorities rather than those of
1889 or 1932, such an approach is justified. The basic constitutional
system, which survived the enactment of the SMA, is compatible with
this approach. In effect, the two systems establish a double veto over
uses of coastal waters. An activity in conflict with either system will
not be allowed.
B. Federal Controls and Influences on Coastal Management
The state is not the only actor in the management of the coastal
zone. The federal government has long exercised management powers
in this area and in 1972 substantially expanded its authority by enact-
ing the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act 22 and amending the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.23
1. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
An Army Corps of Engineers permit is required for any obstruction
or alteration of navigable waters under section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.24 Navigable waters are defined
for this purpose to include any area to the ebb and flow of the tide up
to the mean high water mark. 25 Jurisdiction also extends to manmade
canals on private property that connect to navigable waters. 26 The
Corps must balance the expected benefit from the project against its
reasonably foreseeable detriments and may decline to issue the permit
if it finds the obstruction or alteration is not in the public interest. 27
2. Federal harbor line systems
The Army Corps of Engineers also establishes harbor lines on be-
half of the federal government, marking pierhead or bulkhead limits
22. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976)).
23. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-
500, § 2, 86 Stat. 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976)) (now called the Clean Water
Act).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
25. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)(1977).
26. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates. Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
modified, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
27. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f)(1) (1977).
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in navigable waters.28 Although these lines are no longer as important
as they once were, they still have some legal significance. In the past
there has been some confusion about the relation of these lines to state
harbor lines. To further the confusion, federal and state harbor lines
are often located in the same place, although they have different func-
tions. Although the federal law calling for the establishment of federal
harbor lines uses the term "harbor lines," they are usually referred to
as either pierhead lines or bulkhead lines. To avoid confusion, this ar-
ticle refers to state harbor lines as harbor lines and federal harbor
lines as either pierhead or bulkhead lines.
Originally, bulkhead lines marked the seaward limit where a per-
son could fill without a permit; pierhead lines were the seaward limit
where open-pile structures could be placed without a permit.29 The
first pierhead and bulkhead lines in Washington were often estab-
lished at the same time as the state harbor lines. The state and the
Corps worked together, generally placing the outer harbor line and
the pierhead line in the same place, and the inner harbor line and the
bulkhead line in the same place.3" However, the pierhead line and the
outer harbor line had different functions. The outer harbor line was
the absolute limit beyond which no construction could occur;31 the
pierhead line was merely the limit beyond which no construction
could occur without federal permission.32 Often one line would be
changed while the other remained in place.33
An additional significance of federal harbor lines is that no federal
money can be spent for dredging shoreward of them.34 Therefore, if
the federal government wants to dredge shoreward of pierhead or
bulkhead lines, it abrogates the lines. This occurred, for example,
when the federal government wanted to develop the Shilshole Bay
Marina in Seattle.35
The gradual change in the use of federal harbor lines eventually
culminated in a 1970 regulation changing them to mere guidelines,
for use with respect to navigation alone. 36 A permit is now required
28. 33 U.S.C. § 404(1976); 33 C.F.R. § 209.150 (1977).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1976); 33 C.F.R. § 209.150 (1977); Interview with Robert
Spearman, Army Corps of Engineers, Seattle (July 11, 1978) (notes on file with Wash-
ington Law Review).
30. Interview with Robert Spearman, supra note 29.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.008 (1976).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1976); 33 C.F.R. § 209.150 (1977).
33. Interview with Robert Spearman, supra note 29.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 628 (1976).
35. Interview with Robert Spearman, supra note 29.
36. 33 C.F.R. § 209.150 (1977).
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for any works in navigable waters whether shoreward or seaward of
federal harbor lines.37 Therefore, the only remaining real significance
of federal harbor lines is that federal money cannot be expended for
dredging shoreward of the lines. 38
3. Federal Coastal Zone Management Act
The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act39 sets standards for
state coastal zone management programs and provides two major in-
centives for states to comply with these standards. First, states meet-
ing the federal standards receive federal funding for development and
implementation of the state programs. 40 Second, once the state coastal
zone management program has been federally approved, the activities
of all federal agencies in that state's coastal zone must be consistent
with the state coastal zone management program to the maximum ex-
tent practicable. 41 The Washington coastal zone management pro-
gram was the first state program in the nation to receive federal ap-
proval.42
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 197243 gave the Corps of Engineers extremely broad
powers of control over filling and construction in navigable waters of
the United States. "Navigable waters" are defined broadly to include
not only tidal waters, but also adjacent wetlands, mudflats, and
37. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
38. Applications for establishing or modifying federal harbor lines are now being
treated in the same manner as permit applications. 33 C.F.R. § 209.150(c) (1977). In
practice, however, the federal government will spend no more money on federal harbor
lines, except in cases where they must abrogate the lines in order to proceed with navi-
gational improvements shoreward of existing lines.
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
40. Id. §§ 1453(g), 1454, 1455.
41. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
42. The Washington Coastal Zone Management Program should be distinguished
from the Shoreline Management Act. The SMA is a specific statute establishing a
coastal management system for the state. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976). The
Coastal Zone Management Program is the combination of state and local laws that au-
thorizes overall governmental management of the coastal zone. The Program includes.
among others, the following: the State Environmental Policy Act, id. ch. 43.2 IC; the En-
ergy Facility Site Evaluation Act, id. ch. 80.50; the Environmental Coordination Pro-
cedures Act, id. ch. 90.62; the Shoreline Management Act, id. ch. 90.58; the Water
Pollution Control Act, id. ch. 90.48; and the Washington Clean Air Act, id. ch. 70.94.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976).
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swamps. 44 Corps' regulations require an ecological evaluation of the
proposed fill or construction before a permit may be granted. 45 The
permit may either be issued with conditions designed to minimize the
adverse effects on the aquatic environment or denied altogether if, de-
spite conditions, the dredge or fill will have an unacceptable adverse
effect. 46 Although the Corps initially dragged its feet in implementing
its section 404 authority,47 current Corps policy is to conduct its sec-
tion 404 permit program consistent with the state program, if any.
The Corps will not, for example, issue a permit if the state declines to
do so and only occasionally will refuse a permit if the state issues
one.
48
C. The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington
One of the most ancient and venerable doctrines relating to the har-
bor line system is the public trust doctrine. This doctrine and the har-
bor line system constitute parallel and partially coincident approaches
to the protection of the public interest in the beds of navigable waters.
The most significant expression of the public trust doctrine is found
in Illinois Central Railway v. Illinois.49 In Illinois Central, the Su-
preme Court upheld the repeal by a state legislature of an earlier
legislative grant to the Illinois Central Railroad of part of the bed of
Chicago harbor in Lake Michigan. In upholding the repeal the court
declared:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private
parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improve-
ment of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be
disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains,
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of govern-
ment and the preservation of the peace.50
44. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2) (1977).
45. Id. § 209.120(f).
46. 40 C.F.R § 230.3(d) (1977).
47. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685
(D.D.C. 1975).
48. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37138 (1977) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(h)).
49. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
50. Id. at 453. The public trust doctrine has subsequently been applied by various
state courts. In California, for example, the cases have held that the beds of navigable
waters up to the line of ordinary high tide, whether publicly or privately owned,
are held in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery. A public ease-
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Illinois Central was decided in 1892. The Washington constitutional
harbor line system was adopted in 1889. In Illinois Central, the court
said that even a legislative grant of the beds of navigable waters could
be invalid if it violated the public trust. No attempt was made to de-
fine the precise nature or extent of that trust, or to say just which
leases and conveyances by state agencies could be set aside. Courts
and writers have taken widely divergent views of these matters in the
intervening years.51 The drafters of the Washington Constitution
sought to protect this same public interest by creating a Harbor Line
Commission charged with identifying specific harbor lines and harbor
areas in state-owned navigable waters and beds and by imposing a
specific set of constraints on conveyances and leases of these lands by
state agencies. 52
Nothing in the Washington harbor line system, however, should be
taken to negate the public trust doctrine in this state. The doctrine has
been acknowledged by the Washington court, although it has not been
relied upon as extensively here as in some other states, for example,
California5 3 and Wisconsin,5 4 which, like Washington, give high pri-
ority to water-related values. The reason may be that the harbor line
system has reduced the need for reliance on the public trust doctrine
and has, at least until recently, given adequate protection to many of
ment and servitude exists over these lands for those purposes .... The right of the
state is subservient to the public rights of navigation and fishery, and theoretically.
at least, the state can make no disposition of them prejudicial to the right of the
public to use them for the purposes of navigation and fishery, and whatever disposi-
tion she does make of them, her grantee takes them upon the same terms upon
which she holds them, and of course subject to the public rights above mentioned."
People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913) (quoting Ward v. Hul-
ford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867)). A 1971 California case has held that the public trust doc-
trine protects not only the historically recognized public rights of navigation and fishery
but is "flexible" enough to "encompass changing public needs" such as ecological and
environmental values. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 796 (1971). Massachusetts has applied its public trust doctrine to various
land and lake surface areas, ruling, for example, a state highway department cannot
build a highway through parklands, great ponds, state reservations, or kindred areas un-
der general statutory authority to use state lands for highway purposes; instead, as to
these lands, it can use them for highways only when the legislature explicitly says so. See
Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 308, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1964); See
also Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1956).
These cases are discussed in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471, 492-501 (1970).
51. See generally Sax, supra note 50.
52. WASH. CONST. art. XV.
53. E.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 526, 138 P. 79(1913).
54. State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112,81 N.W.2d71 (1957); Muenchv.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on rehearing, 261 Wis. 492,
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the same public interests which otherwise would have received public
trust doctrine protection. Early Washington cases, although not rely-
ing explicitly on the public trust doctrine, recognized legally protect-
able public interests in navigable waters and beds of the state. 55 In
Hill v. Newell,5 6 the court explicitly approved the reasoning of the
leading California public trust case,57 saying that the public trust lan-
guage of the California case expresses the views of the Washington
court.58 In State v. Sturtevant,59 the court acknowledged that the state
held the right of navigation "in trust for the whole people" of this
state.60 The court did not expressly use the term public trust in Wil-
bour v. Gallagher,61 but it gave strong protection to the public right
of navigation, one of the interests traditionally protected under the
public trust doctrine.
Thus, the public trust doctrine clearly seems to exist in Washing-
ton, although often not called by that name or explicitly articulated or
relied upon by the appellate courts as such. The existence of the doc-
trine in Washington is important because, as indicated below, harbor
lines have been established in only a small percentage of the state's
waters, and even where harbor lines do exist, they do not perfectly re-
flect contemporary public values in navigation and in the beds of na-
vigable waters. The public trust doctrine may be available to protect
these values in a proper case.62
III. WASHINGTON'S HARBOR LINE SYSTEM
The harbor line system established by the Washington Constitution
is a unique way of protecting the public interest in the state's harbor
55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); Merwin v. Houghton, 146 Wis. 398, 131 N.W. 838 (1911); Priewe
v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
55. Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 P. 718 (1905);
Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269,75 P. 807 (1904).
56. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
57. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
58. Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 231, 149 P. 951, 952 (1915). The actual holding
was that the state title to the beds of navigable waters was absolute, and if, pursuant to a
plan to improve navigation, a portion is cut off and no longer useful for navigation, that
portion can be alienated free from public control. Id. at 232, 149 P. at 953.
59. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
60. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037..
61. 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1969).
62. The public trust doctrine might, for example, establish the outer limits of the
Harbor Line Commission's powers to relocate harbor lines, as in the Pier 50-51 contro-
versy, see note 178 infra, or the doctrine might constrain the amount of nonnavigational
activity to be permitted in the harbor area or beyond the outer harbor line.
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areas. 63 The system has generally succeeded in reserving these com-
63. State law also provides specific protection of the public interest in tidelands.
State-owned tidelands are divided into "first class" and "second class" tidelands. First-
class tidelands are
the beds and shores of navigable tidal waters belonging to the state, lying within or
in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within one mile thereof upon either
side and between the line of ordinary high tide and the inner harbor line, and within
two miles of the corporate limits on either side and between the line of ordinary
high tide and the line of extreme low tide.
WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.020 (1976). "Second class tidelands" are state-owned tide-
lands that are not "first class tidelands." Id. § 79.01.024. See Figure I infra.
Shorelands are lands bordering on "the shores of a navigable lake or river not subject
to tidal flow, between the line of ordinary high water and the line of navigability." Id. §§
79.01.028; 79.01.032. "First class shorelands" are those in front of or within two miles
of a city, id. § 79.01.028, and "second class shorelands" are those more than two miles
from the corporate limits of a city, id. § 79.01.032.
The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has the power to lease state-owned
tidelands and shorelands and prescribe the terms of the lease consistent with the laws
and the constitution. Id. §§ 43.30.130, 79.01.504, 79.01.536, 79.01.544. Originally the
Commissioner of Public Lands had the power to lease state-owned tidelands and shore-
lands, but in 1957 his powers and duties were transferred to the DNR. State Dep't of
Natural Resources Act, ch. 38, § 13, 1957 Wash. Laws 123 (1957) (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.30.130 (1976)).
The guiding principles for the DNR aquatic land-leasing program are as follows:
(1) Priority is given to water-dependent and water-oriented uses. (2) The statewide
public need is considered. (3) Fair market rental payment [is] required when pub-
lic use is withdrawn for private consumption. (4) Compliance with Shoreline Mas-
ter Program, Corps of Engineers Permit and the State Environmental Policy
Act[is required]. (5) Consideration [is] given to adjacent upland owner prior
to leasing.
W. Johnson, Tideland and Harbor Area Leasing Policies, in SHORELINES MANAGEMENT
'77, PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS 39, 39 (R. Goodwin ed. 1977) (proceedings of a con-
ference, Sept. 22-23, 1977 at the University of Washington.).
Tidelands and shorelands can be leased for up to 55 years. WASH. REV. CODE §
79.01.470(3) (1976). Most leases, however, are issued for terms of ten years with a
preference right to renew if the Commissioner of Public Lands finds it in the public in-
terest to do so. W. Johnson, supra, at 40. There are special provisions for tideland and
shoreland leases for log-booming purposes. The lease can be for only a term of ten
years, and failure to use the land for log-booming purposes for a year causes a forfeiture
of the lease and a reversion of the land to the state. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.01.536,
.540 (1976).
If a lessee of tidelands or shorelands fails to renew the lease, the DNR appraises the
improvements on the lands, and the subsequent lessee (if the lands are leased within
three years of the expiration of the former lease) pays the prior lessee the appraised
value of the improvements. Id. § 79.01.548.
The statute also allows the leasing of beds of navigable waters for log-booming pur-
poses, for the removal of sand and gravel, and for prospecting for, developing, and pro-
ducing oil and gas. Id. §§ 79.14.020, 79.16.536, 79.16.570. Section 43.30.130 allows the
DNR to lease public lands for the purpose of prospecting for, developing, and producing
oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances, and for planting and cultivating oysters,
clams, or other edible shellfish. Id. §§ 43.30.130, 79.01.568-.592.
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mercially important areas for public ownership and control. 64
Article XV of the Washington Constitution requires the legislature
to appoint a Harbor Line Commission to establish harbor areas.65
The first Harbor Line Commission was established in 1890, and when
it went out of existence three years later its duties were transferred to
the Board of State Land Commissioners. 66 In 1957, those duties were
in turn given to the Board of Natural Resources. 67 The Board is the
The statute that authorizes a bed lease without -Lying the lease to a specific purpose
provides:
The Commissioner of Public Lands [now the DNR under R.C.W. § 43.30.130]
may lease to the abutting tide or shoreland owner or lessee, the beds of navigable
waters lying below the line of extreme low tide in waters where the tide ebbs and
flows, and below the line of navigability in lakes and rivers claimed by the state
and defined in section 1, Article XVII of the Constitution of the state, or in case the
abutting tide or shorelands or the abutting uplands are not improved or occupied
for residential or commercial purposes, may lease such beds to any person, firm or
corporation for a period not exceeding ten years for booming purposes. Nothing in
RCW 79.16.530 through 79.16.560 shall change or modify any of the provisions of
the state Constitution or laws of the state which provide for the leasing of harbor
areas and the reservation of lands lying in front thereof.
Id. § 79.16.530. This does not appear to authorize leases of beds to anyone but the abut-
ting land owners or lessees. The only leases to nonabutting owners or lessees that can be
issued under this statute are booming leases under certain conditions. The provisions
for leasing beds of navigable waters are not clear or well organized. They should be
clarified by the legislature. Leases other than booming leases can extend for periods up
to thirty years. Id. § 79.16.540.
64. When Washington entered the Union in 1889 it took title to the beds and shores
of navigable waters within its boundaries, with the exception of the few areas that had
already been granted away by the United States. See United States v. Utah, 403 U.S. 9
(1971). Between 1889 and 1971, approximately 60% of Washington's tidelands were
sold to private parties. DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM 73 (1976). At first, tidelands were sold by metes and bounds fixed by
surveys. Act for Appraisement and Disposal of Tide- and Shore-lands, 1889-90 Wash.
Laws 431 (1889). However, in 1895 a law was passed defining the seaward boundary of
tidelands as "the line of mean low tide" or "the inner harbor line" where one had been
established. Act Relating to Public Lands, ch. CLXXVIII, § 1, 1895 Wash. Laws 527
(1895). The definition was amended 16 years later by extending the boundary of tide-
lands out to "extreme low tide" or "the inner harbor line." Act Relating to State Lands
and Their Management, ch. 36, § 1, 1911 Wash. Laws 129 (1911). Therefore, between
1895 and 1911, tidelands were sold out to mean low tide or the inner harbor line; after
1911, they were sold out to extreme low tide or the inner harbor line. The further sale of
state-owned tidelands and shorelands ceased in 1971. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.470
(1976).
65. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1. Article XV is quoted in its entirety in note 9 supra.
66. Harbor Line Commissioners Act, 1889-90 Wash. Laws 239 (1890). Act Creat-
ing the Board of State Land Commissioners, ch. CXXV, § 6, 1893 Wash. Laws 386
(1893).
67. State Dep't of Natural Resources Act, ch. 38, § 15, 1957 Wash. Laws 123 (1957)
(codified at WASH. RV. CODE § 43.30.150 (4) (1976)).
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policymaking body within the Department of Natural Resources and
is composed of the Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion, the Commissioner of Public Lands, the Dean of the College of
Forestry of the University of Washington, and the Director of the In-
stitute of Agricultural Sciences of Washington State University. 68
The Washington Constitution calls for the establishment of harbor
lines "within or in front" of incorporated cities and "within one mile
. . . on either side." 69 In 1927, the legislature directed the Commis-
sion to establish outer harbor lines, marking the outer boundary of
the harbor beyond which the state can never grant any rights, and in-
ner harbor lines, marking the landward extent of the harbor area.70
The bed of the harbor area is owned by the state and "forever re-
served for landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navi-
gation and commerce. 71 Within these limitations the state can build
structures in the harbor area or lease it to private persons for a period
not to exceed thirty years, and cities can extend streets over the har-
bor area.72
The width of the harbor area was originally between 50 and 600
feet, but when article XV was amended in 1932, the permissible max-
imum harbor width was extended to 2,000 feet. 73 The outer harbor
line is generally located in water deep enough to accommodate vessels
with the maximum expected draft. The inner harbor line is generally
at or near the line of low tide, but because harbor areas must include
only state-owned land, it is never nearer shore than state ownership
extends.74 Figure 1 illustrates how harbor lines might be drawn in
front of a hypothetical city.
Since the amendment to article XV in 1932, it has been clear that
the harbor line system applies to navigable fresh as well as salt waters.
The phrase "ordinary high tide" in the original article was replaced by
"ordinary high water. '75 The change in language made explicit the in-
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.30.040 (1976).
69. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § I.
70. Public Lands Act, ch. 255, § 1, 1927 Wash. Laws 468 (1927) (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 79.01.044 (1976)).
71. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
72. Id. H3 2-3.
73. Id. § 1 (1889, amended 1932, amend. 15).
74. 1972 HARBOR AREA STUDY, supra note 4, at 17.
75. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (1889, amended 1932, amend. 15). Prior to the
change, it was argued that the reference to "the line of ordinary high tide" in section 1
and to "intervening tidelands" in section 3 of article XV required that article XV be re-
stricted to tidelands. The argument that article XV applied to all navigable waters was
based on the language in section I providing for harbor lines "in the navigable waters of
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terpretation given to the original article XV by the Washington Su-
preme Court.76
A. Management of the Harbor Area by State Agencies
The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has the power to
lease and manage saltwater harbor areas. 77 If the harbor area lies
within a port district, the port commission has the power to make
nonbinding recommendations "as to the character of the improve-
ments, time of commencement and completion thereof, the percent-
age for fixing rental, and the terms and conditions of the lease." 78 Or-
dinarily, upon receipt of a lease application, the DNR forwards a
copy to the concerned port commission and generally accepts its rec-
ommendations.79 The DNR can prescribe the terms of the lease.80
Plans for proposed structures in the harbor area must accompany the
lease application, and approved structures must be completed within
the time specified by the DNR.81
State-owned freshwater harbor areas are leased by the port com-
mission in that port district.82 The port commission has powers simi-
lar to those of the DNR in saltwater harbor areas to the extent that it
can approve plans for construction in the leased area and can set the
time period within which such construction must be commenced.83
B. Uses Allowed in Harbor Areas
Article XV of the Washington Constitution mandates that the
state's harbor areas "shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves,
streets, and other conveniences of navigation and commerce"84 and
that the legislature shall provide laws for "the leasing of the right to
build and maintain wharves, docks and other structures, upon the
all harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets of this state." 1903-04 Op. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. 306
(1904); cf. 1891-92 Op. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. 104 (1891).
76. State ex rel. Seattle v. Savidge, 95 Wash. 240, 246, 163 P. 738, 740-41 (1917);
Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 134, 160 P. 310, 312-13 (1916); State v. Sturte-
vant, 76 Wash. 158, 164-65, 135 P. 1035, 1037-38 (1913).
77. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.30.130, 79.01.504 (1976).
78. Id. § 79.01.504.
79. Interview with Dep't of Natural Resources staff (May 9, 1978).
80. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.30.130, 79.01.504 (1976).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 53.32.010.
83. Id.
84. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
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areas mentioned in section one of this article. '8 5 There are few Wash-
ington cases interpreting the phrase "conveniences of navigation and
commerce" and none more recent than 1927. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to discern an expansion in the concept of "commerce" as it relates
to harbor areas similar to the expansion of that concept in the inter-
pretation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.86
1. Court interpretations of "conveniences of navigation and
commerce"
The Washington Supreme Court first addressed these questions in
1898 in State ex rel. Denny v. Bridges.87 The court upheld the denial
of a harbor area lease for the purpose of curing and canning fish,
maintaining a retail and wholesale fish market, and making, storing,
and selling ice for fish packing because the proposed use was not al-
lowable under the constitution. It said that the word "navigation" was
used as a qualification of the word "commerce," and "other struc-
tures" meant conveniences of navigation and commerce.8 8 This re-
strictive early interpretation of article XV allowed only navigation
uses in harbor areas.
In 1909, the Supreme Court rejected the Denny interpretation in
State ex rel. Hulme v. Grays Harbor & Puget Sound Railway.89 A rail-
road company wanted to build its track across a harbor area. The
court declared that commerce by land and commerce by sea were too
intimately related for the framers of the constitution to have intended
the phrase "navigation and commerce" in as restrictive a sense as the
Denny case implied. The Grays Harbor court reasoned that if the
framers had wanted to restrict use of harbor areas solely to commerce
by sea, they would have said so explicitly.9 0 The court avoided over-
ruling Denny by deeming the interpretation of "navigation and com-
merce" in Denny to be mere dictum: "The real point at issue in that
case was whether the state had power to lease the harbor area to ac-
commodate a private interest only remotely connected with
85. Id. § 2.
86. Compare, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
87. 19 Wash. 44, 52 P. 326 (1898).
88. Id. at 47, 52 P. at 327.
89. 54 Wash. 530, 103 P. 809 (1909).
90. Id. at 535-36, 103 P. at 811. The court concluded that it was constitutional for
the railroad to cross the harbor area as long as it did not obstruct the navigation of the
stream. Id. at 537, 103 P. at 812.
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commerce."91 Thus, although the court rejected the language in
Denny, it apparently still thought that curing and selling fish and stor-
ing and selling ice were improper activities in a harbor area.92 The
permitted uses in the harbor areas under article XV were still rather
narrowly restricted.
The court expressly overruled Denny in 1927 in State ex rel. Bloe-
del-Donovan Lumber Mills v. Savidge.93 In that case, the owner of a
dock in Bellingham was building a paper mill on his tidelands and
wanted to modify his harbor lease so that part of his dock in the har-
bor area could be used for the paper mill. The court declared that
manufacture and commerce are closely linked; manufacturing has to
do with the production of commodities and without manufacturing
there would be no commerce. The court noted that only twenty per-
cent of the dock would be used for manufacturing. The remainder
would still be devoted to shipping purposes. The court further noted
that only five percent of the harbor areas in waterfront cities in Wash-
ington were being used for wharves and docks; the state obviously
could control harbor areas so that there would be sufficient wharves
and docks to meet the public need without prohibiting other trade or
business use. The court ruled that the lease should be modified to al-
low manufacturing improvements so long as there was sufficient space
available to meet the needs of commerce. 94 Thus, it appears that if
there is sufficient harbor area to satisfy the needs of navigation and
commerce, the court will not prohibit the use of a harbor area for an-
other purpose, at least if it is closely related to commerce. 95
91. Id. at 535, 103 P. at811.
92. Interestingly, it seems that curing and selling fish is more closely related to
navigation and commerce than some current harbor area uses, such as motels and retail
stores.
93. 144 Wash. 302, 310, 258 P. 1, 3 (1927). In Bloedel the court also rejected its ear-
lier statement in Denny that the term "navigation" limited the term "commerce." The
Bloedel court went on to say that manufacturing was related to commerce and was
therefore permitted. It did not attempt to define "conveniences of navigation and com-
merce."
94. Id. at 306-11,258 P. at 4.
95. The court has not addressed this question since 1927. However, in 1970 it heard
an appeal relating to the standards of valuation and assessment, for tax purposes, of a
lease of a harbor area in Seattle upon which the Edgewater Inn Motor Hotel is built. In
the first footnote it stated that "in.. . the first appeal in the instant case the court inaccu-
rately identified the property as tidelands. It appears in the findings of fact that Pier 67
is within the boundaries of a harbor area and is governed by the constitutional provi-
sions and statutes applicable thereto." Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wn. 2d 48, 49
n.1, 469 P.2d 902, 904 n.1 (1970). The court did not discuss these constitutional
provisions or indicate whether it believed the Edgewater Inn complied with the constitu-
tional provisions.
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Clearly, times have changed since 1927 when this doctrine was es-
tablished. The court in Bloedel-Donovan established the general rule
that the harbor area is properly reserved for "conveniences of naviga-
tion and commerce" so long as the state controls the leasing of the
area and insures that nonconstitutional uses give way to constitutional
uses96 when necessary. The question must still be asked, in the mod-
ern setting, what are constitutional uses, and whether there currently
is sufficient room for them. With the increasing pressures on Wash-
ington's harbor areas, these questions should be readdressed and cur-
rent harbor area uses should be reevaluated.
2. State control of harbor areas: DNR policies for land use
management
In addition to restricting the harbor area to certain uses, a primary
purpose of the harborline system is to retain state control of the har-
bor area.97 The state owns the beds of harbor areas, and leases por-
tions to private persons and corporations. However, the state retains
control over the leased area through the lease provisions. 98 Structures
in tidal harbor areas must be approved by the DNR and must be built
within the time specified by the state.99 Structures in state-owned
freshwater harbor areas are controlled by the local port district.100
In 1899, the legislature amended the state leasing statutes to pro-
"vide that "[t] he lessee of any part of such harbor area may at his or
its option, improve the same in such manner, subject to the approval
of the board and to such extent as such lessee shall elect."'' 1 This was
held unconstitutional in State ex rel. Trimble v. Bridges'0 2 because al-
lowing a lessee to decide whether to improve the harbor area would
relinquish state control over the area. The lessee could hold the area
for thirty years without improving it, and the state could not improve
the area or require its improvement. State ex rel. Trimble v. Bridges
96. As used in this article, "nonconstitutional" uses are those less directly related to
navigation and commerce, for example, apartments, restaurants, and business establish-
ments; "constitutional" uses are those closely related to navigation and commerce, for
example, wharves, landings, and docks.
97. "The manifest purpose of this section [WASH. CONST. art. XV, § I] is to prevent
the control of the waterfront of cities from ever falling into private hands." Chlopeck
Fish Co. v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 315, 323, 117 P. 232, 235 (1911).
98. WASH. REv. CODE §H 53.30.010, .020,79.01.504, .508 (1976).
99. Id. §3 19.671.504, .508.
100. Id. H 53.30.010,.020.
101. Act Relating to Public Lands, ch. CXXII, 1899 Wash. Laws 225 (1899).
102. 22 Wash. 98, 60 P. 66 (1900).
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firmly establishes the power of the state, through the DNR and the
port districts, to exercise control over Washington's harbor areas
through its control over harbor leases.
In 1972, the DNR adopted a harbor area land use management
classification system which classifies uses based on the degree to
which they conform to the constitutional directive that harbor areas
be reserved for "conveniences of navigation and commerce. 103 Uses
are divided into five groups.
Group I encompasses "water dependent commerce," which is the
preferred use. It includes industries that require water transport and
provide a service to others. Leases may be granted for up to thirty
years with no restrictions on renewals.1 04
Group II includes "water oriented commerce," which covers com-
mercial uses that require water, but do not serve others. These are
considered to comply with the constitutional use reservation, but are
assigned a lower priority and may be asked to yield to water-depen-
dent uses. Leases may be issued for periods up to thirty years, but
contain restrictions on renewal.1 05
103. Dep't of Natural Resources, Harbor Area Land Use Management Classifica-
tions (Dec. 19, 1972) (on file with Washington Law Review).
104. Typical uses in this group, according to the DNR policy, are "(1) Public or pri-
vate terminal and transfer facilities which handle general commerce; (2) ferry and pas-
senger terminals; (3) naval construction and repair facilities; (4) marinas and mooring
areas; (5) tug and barge companies." Id. at 1.
105. Typical uses in this group include "(1) pulp and paper mills; (2) lumber and
plywood mills; (3) fish processing plants; (4) sand and gravel companies; (5) petroleum
handling and processing plants." Id. at 1-2.
On August 23, 1977 the DNR staff requested that the Harbor Line Commission ap-
prove a policy change in the harbor area use classification system so that a use of the
harbor area could be considered to comply with the water-dependent (Group I) or wa-
ter-oriented (Group II) commerce designation if 80% of the harbor area is used for wa-
ter-dependent or water-oriented uses. Dep't of Natural Resources, Harbor Area Land
Use Management Classifications, Request for Policy Change (August 23, 1977) (on file
with Washington Law Review). This request was denied because the Commission pre-
ferred to deal with these situations individually. Interview with William A. Johnson, Su-
pervisor, Division of Marine Land Management, Dep't of Natural Resources (July 31.
1978) (notes on file with Washington Law Review). At the same time there was also a
request for a policy variation for a harbor lease in Bremerton. The lessee wished to re-
new a lease for 30 years, with 80% of the harbor area to be used for a boat marina and
20% to be used for an apartment complex. Although the apartment complex was a
nonconstitutional use, the staff determined that the needs of navigation and commerce
would be adequately met over the next 30 years and recommended that the lease be is-
sued. Dep't of Natural Resources, Bremerton Harbor Area Lease No. 2339, Request for
Policy Variance (August 23, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review). The lease
was approved by the Commission; however, it has not yet been issued because the
proper shorelines permits have not yet been obtained. Interview with William A. John-
son, supra.
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Group III covers "other water dependent and water oriented uses."
These are low priority uses which do not make an important contribu-
tion to navigation or commerce. Leases are granted in areas that are
not needed or suitable for constitutional uses for periods up to twenty
years, with provisions that they cannot be renewed.10 6
Group IV covers "all other uses," that is, those that do not require
a waterfront location and are not closely linked with a water-depen-
dent use. These include apartments, hotels, taverns, retail stores, and
private residences. No new leases will be issued for these uses. Re-
newal leases will be issued for a maximum of ten years and will
contain restrictive provisions. 107
The fifth classification covers areas withdrawn from use by the
DNR. These are areas where constitutional uses cannot be located,
for example, in severely exposed areas or where such use would be
contrary to the public interest, for example, near a public beach. No
leases are issued for these areas. 108
These classifications seem in accord with the Bloedel-Donovan
holding that areas not needed for constitutional uses can be devoted
to other uses if the harbor area has wharves and docks sufficient to
meet all public requirements and the state retains control in case the
area should later be required for constitutional uses. 109 The harbor
area being used for nonconstitutional uses is still reserved for "con-
veniences of navigation and commerce" because the uses can be
changed if necessary.
3. Streets in harbor areas
Section 3 of article XV simply states: "Municipal corporations
shall have the right to extend their streets over intervening tidelands
to and across the area reserved as herein provided.""10 In the late
1800's the city of Seattle laid out Railroad Avenue, on the tidelands
along the edge of Elliott Bay. It touched the uplands only where it be-
gan and it was not an extension of any street. Although it was de-
106. Dep't of Natural Resources, Harbor Area Land Use Management Classifica-
tions 2 (Dec. 19, 1972) (on file with Washington Law Review). Typical uses include "(1)
public ecological and scientific reserves; (2) public waterfront parks; (3) public use
beaches; (4) aquariums available to the public; (5) restaurants available to the public;
(6) resorts and convention centers available to the public." Id. at 2.
107. "Warehouses not directly associated with water born [sic] commerce" also
fall within this category. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id. at 3.
109. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
110. WASH. CONsT. art. XV, § 3.
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clared to be a public street, its actual purpose was to provide a right-
of-way for railroads. A lower court ruled that Railroad Avenue was a
street authorized by the constitution and statutes of the state. The su-
preme court reversed, holding that cities could extend their streets
only across tidelands in the same direction as, and with the same
width of, existing streets.'11 The purpose of article XV, section 3, de-
clared the court, was only to allow the public "to freely reach the har-
bor area."'1 12
The ruling was quoted with approval four years later in Ilwaco v.
Ilwaco Railway & Navigation Co.1 13 The town of Ilwaco had at-
tempted to extend a street across tidelands at an angle not a direct
projection of the street on the upland and to include improvements
within the street area. The court quoted article XV, section 3 of the
constitution and reiterated that, in exercising its constitutional rights
to extend streets over tidelands, the city must extend streets in a direct
line, that is, in the same direction and with the same width as the up-
land street. 114 The right of cities to extend their streets over tidelands
to and across the harbor area is thus clearly limited by the condition
that these streets must be straight-line extensions of upland streets.' 1 5
A city's right to extend a street over tidelands is also limited by
prior improvements located in the tidelands where the street is to be
extended. In the two cases dealing with this issue, the Washington Su-
preme Court has held that if cities do not exercise their power to ex-
tend streets in a timely fashion, 1 6 the state may exercise its leasing
power to the detriment of the city's right. 117 Once land is leased by the
111. Seattle & M. Ry. v. State, 7 Wash. 150, 34 P. 551 (1893). The case also in-
volved construction of a state statute that was slightly broader than the constitutional
provision, however, even with the more liberal statute, the court found that Railroad
Avenue was not authorized. Id. at 156-57, 34 P. at 553.
112. Id. at 157, 34 P. at 553.
113. 17 Wash. 652,50 P.572(1897).
114. Id. at 658, 50 P. at 574.
115. In State ex rel. Bartlett v. Forrest, 12 Wash. 483, 41 P. 194 (1895), and Colum-
bia & P.S. R.R. v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. 332, 33 P. 824 (1893), the court upheld
straight-line extensions of upland streets.
116. It is probably sufficient for a city to plat the extension or otherwise reserve a
specific portion of the tideland. See note 117 infra.
117. In the earlier case, State ex rel. Gatzert-Schwabacher Land Co. v. Bridges, 19
Wash. 428, 53 P. 547 (1898), an upland owner in Seattle purchased tidelands and ap-
plied for a lease of the harbor area contiguous to the tidelands. The lease was denied.
The state thought it lacked authority because both the tidelands purchased by appellant
and the harbor area sought to be leased would be part of Union Street if it were to be
extended. The validity of the tideland conveyance was questioned for the same reason.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court noted that there was nothing in article XV,
section 3, of the constitution that limited the exercise of a city's right to extend streets to
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state, a city can extend its streets only by condemning the improve-
ments it would destroy.'1 8 Any other holding would have severely im-
paired the power granted the state by article XV to lease the harbor
area because any lease would be subject to a city's right to plat and
extend a new street.
The state, as well as the city, has power to lay out streets in harbor
areas. Its power derives from section 1 of article XV and is less re-
stricted than the cities' power. Section 1 provides that the harbor area
is under control of the state and reserved for "landings, wharves,
streets, and other conveniences of navigation and commerce." 1 9 This
has been interpreted as granting the state the power to lay out streets in
any manner. 20
C. The Duty to Draw Harbor Lines
The Washington Constitution says that a commission shall be ap-
pointed "whose duty it shall be to locate and establish harbor lines in
the navigable waters of all harbors, estuaries, bays and inlets of this
state, wherever such navigable waters lie within or in front of the cor-
porate limits of any city or within one mile thereof on either side."' 2 '
Soon after the first Harbor Line Commission was established, the
and across harbor areas to streets in existence at the time of platting the harbor. How-
ever, if the right to extend streets continues into the indefinite future, the value of tide-
lands to be sold and harbor areas to be leased would be impaired. A city could take the
area at any time without compensation whenever it wanted to extend a street. When the
Seattle waterfront was platted, only every other street was extended across the tide-
lands. Union Street was not one of those so extended. The court held that since the city
could have extended the street over the tidelands without cost when it platted the area
and did not do so, the state had the power to dispose of the tidelands. The city could no
longer extend its streets over the leased area unless it compensated the lessor for any
loss.
In the second case, In re Percival Application No. 92, 91 Wash. 470, 157 P. 1082
(1916), the Board of State Land Commissioners leased to J.C. Percival a portion of the
harbor area in front of the city of Olympia, upon which he had maintained a wharf since
before 1889. The city challenged the lease, because the lease interfered with the city's
right to extend certain streets. In 1891 the Commissioners had platted the area without
designating the extension of any streets. The city did not object. Moreover, the city
never attempted to physically occupy the area, and did not notify the Board of State
Land Commissioners of its intent to extend the streets in question until 1913. The court
held that the city had lost its right to extend its streets over the harbor area. Percival's
long use and improvement, acquiesced in by the city, entitled him to receive the lease.
118. See State ex rel. Gatzert-Schwabacher Land Co. v. Bridges, 19 Wash. 428, 429,
53 P. 547, 547 (1898).
119. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
120. Chlopeck Fish Co. v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 315, 324, 117 P. 232, 235
(1911).
121. WASH. CONsT. art. XV, § 1.
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Washington Attorney General opined that harbor areas need not be
established in "all navigable waters in front of incorporated cities, but
only in such navigable waters as are within a harbor, estuary, bay or
inlet.' 22 The Attorney General concluded that the Commission was
required to determine whether the waters in front of a city were in fact
a harbor, 123 bay, estuary, or inlet and to establish harbor lines only in
those places.124
In practice, harbor areas have not been established in all potential
harbors. They have been established only where there has been "a
demonstrated need, demand, and available funds to cover the
cost."' 25 In 1972, the DNR adopted a provisional policy governing
the establishment of new harbor areas until a comprehensive study is
completed of the national dependence on Washington state harbors
and a statewide harbor development plan is adopted. 126 The provi-
sional policy provides that no new harbor areas for deep-draft com-
merce shall be established until all suitable space in existing harbors is
occupied with water-dependent commerce or important existing in-
dustries. The policy further provides that additional harbor areas for
normal-draft commerce will be established when (1) the area in
question is abutting or within one mile of an incorporated city or
town on navigable water, (2) the area is developed for water-depen-
dent commerce,' 27 (3) the chief official representing the community
requests the designation, and (4) the Harbor Line Commission deter-
mines that establishment of a harbor area pursuant to article XV of
the constitution is in the state or national interest.128
The Washington courts have never decided whether harbor lines
must be drawn in front of all cities. Because the question may have an
important impact on property owners, a consideration of the effect of
having harbor lines established in front of privately owned tidelands
and shorelands follows.
122. 1891-92 Op. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. 104, 106 (1891) (emphasis in original).
123. A harbor is a portion of a body of water sufficiently enclosed by land "to af-
ford a shelter or place of refuge for vessels." Id.
124. Id.
125. 1972 HARBOR AREA STUDY, supra note 4, at 17.
126. Dep't of Natural Resources, Provisional Policy Statement (Dec. 21, 1972) (on
file with Washington Law Review).
127. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
128. Dep't of Natural Resources, Provisional Policy Statement (Dec. 21, 1972) (on
file with Washington Law Review).
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D. Effect of Harbor Lines
1. Leases
Washington statutes provide for leasing of harbor areas 129 and the
beds of navigable waters 3 0 to private persons. Harbor areas can be
leased for periods of up to thirty years. 131 Any improvements in the
leased area must be approved by the DNR 132 or the local port dis-
trict. 133 Where there are no harbor areas, beds of navigable waters
can also be leased for up to thirty years. 134 Again, plans for proposed
improvements must be filed with the DNR. 35
The creation of a harbor area thus does not affect the terms of
leases of the area. The creation of a harbor area may, however, affect
eligibility for a lease in saltwater areas. One difference between har-
bor area leases and bed leases is that upland and tideland owners
abutting saltwater harbor areas have no preference right to lease the
harbor, 136 whereas the abutting tideland or shoreland owner or lessee
has a preference right to lease the bed where there are no harbor
lines.137 The owner of shoreland bordering a freshwater harbor area
has a preference right to lease the harbor area. 3 8
2. Right to fill
In 1913, the Washington Supreme Court stated in State v. Sturte-
vant1 39 that tidelands and shorelands were sold into private ownership
on the theory that "all land lying back of the inner harbor line or the
line of ordinary navigability would be reclaimed and put to useful
purposes.' 140 The court also stated, "The area lying between high wa-
ter and the line of navigability, as fixed or to be fixed by the inner
harbor line, being, whether submerged or not, theoretically nonnavig-
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.504 (1976).
130. Id. § 79.16.530.
131. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 2.
132. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 43.30.130, 79.01.508 (1976).
133. Id. § 53.32.010.
134. Id. § 79.16.540. If the bed is leased for log booming, the lease can be issued for
only 10 years. Id.
135. Id. § 79.16.550.
136. Id. § 79.01.504.
137. Id. § 79.16.530.
138. Id. § 53.32.020.
139. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
140. Id. at 171, 135 P. at 1040.
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able, is treated as land and not water ... ,"141 Prior to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court decision in Wilbour v. Gallagher'42 and the subse-
quent enactment of the Shoreline Management Act, this language was
generally thought to confirm a right in the shoreowner to fill
shoreward of the inner harbor line. If any vestige of such a right still
remains, the same right should be recognized for tidelands and shore-
lands where harbor lines have not been established. This can be in-
ferred from the fact that the court did not merely refer to the inner
harbor line in its discussion; it also referred to the line of ordinary na-
vigability, which is the boundary of shorelands when no harbor lines
are established. 143 Also, although the court did not discuss tidelands
where there were no harbor lines because this case related specifically
to shorelands, the general theoretical discussion should apply to
both. 144 It thus seems that any potential right to fill should not depend
on the existence of a harbor line. If such a right exists but is not recog-
nized for tidelands and shorelands where harbor lines have not been
established, a landowner could argue that he has a constitutional right
to have harbor lines located in front of his first-class tidelands or
shorelands if they are within a mile of the city.
The existence of a harbor area is unlikely to have a significant ef-
fect on the uses an abutting landowner can make of his own land un-
der other regulatory schemes. Both federal' 45 and state 46 legislation
require permits for any filling or construction on shorelands or tide-
lands. These statutes and the regulations promulgated under them 47
make no distinction between lands abutting harbor areas and those
abutting navigable beds. a48
3. Tidelands
Although harbor lines may create larger tideland areas,' 49 estab-
141. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037.
142. 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). See
text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
143. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 165, 135 P. 1035, 1037 (1913).
144. In its general discussion about the early decision to sell shorelands and tide-
lands, the court discussed both tidelands and shorelands. Id. at 171, 135 P. at 1040.
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(1976).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140 (Supp. 1977).
147. 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1977); WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 173-16 (1977).
148. With the passage of the Shorelines Management Act in 1971, there are now re-
strictions on placement of fills on shorelands and tidelands, so the argument of a right to
fill out to the inner harbor line may well be moot. See Part 1I-A supra.
149. First-class tidelands include "the beds and shores of navigable tidal waters be-
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lishing an inner harbor line seaward of privately owned tidelands
would not give the tideland owner additional tideland; it would
merely create a new area of state-owned tidelands between privately
owned tidelands and the bed of the navigable water. This could not be
sold to the private owner, but could be leased to him, thus creating
additional usable tidelands. The newly created state-owned tidelands
would then be subject to less restrictive lease provisions than the state-
owned bed. 150 This appears to be the only reason for a land owner to
desire establishment of a harbor area but it does not suggest any basis
for argument that a land owner has a constitutional right to have har-
bor lines set in front of his or her land.
E. Uses Beyond the Outer Harbor Line
Article XV of the Washington Constitution states that "[t] he state
shall never give, sell, or lease to any private person, corporation, or
association any rights whatever in the waters beyond such harbor
lines . . . . 151 The phrase "the waters beyond such harbor lines" has
not been interpreted by either the Washington courts or the Attorney
General. Any waters that are not within harbor lines could be said to
be included. Such an interpretation would mean that the beds of nav-
igable waters abutting first- and second-class tidelands where no har-
bor lines have been established are covered by the prohibition against
granting rights to private persons. The same would also be true of the
beds lying directly seaward of the harbor lines. 152
A more reasonable interpretation, however, is that the prohibition
in article XV applies only to waters seaward of where harbor lines
have been established because these areas are the subject matter of ar-
ticle XV. There is reason to keep these free from obstructions because
they are the areas where ships must go in order to reach the harbors.
Article XV could conceivably prevent location of bridges, piers, ca-
longing to the state, lying within or in front of the corporate limits of any city, or within
one mile thereof upon either side and between the line of ordinary high tide and the
inner harbor line." WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.020 (1976).
150. For example, tidelands can be leased for up to 55 years, WASH. REV. CODE §
79.01.470(3) (1976), whereas beds can be leased for only 30 years, WASH. CONST. art.
XV, § 2.
151. WASH. CONT. art. XV, § 1.
152. This could be supported by arguing that, while most of article XV just applies
to geographical harbor areas because that is the area needed for wharves and docks and
where ships take refuge, the prohibition on granting any rights in the waters applies to
all the rest of the navigable waters because all the rest of the area is used for water-borne
commerce and must be free from obstruction.
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bles or pipelines on the bed in any navigable waters in Washington
outside of harbor waters.153
Although the Washington Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed what use can be made of property beyond harbor lines, in
State ex rel. Hulme v. Grays Harbor & Puget Sound Railway154 it dis-
cussed whether a railroad corporation could build a railroad across a
navigable river at a point where the tide ebbs and flows. This railroad
bridge extended across the tidelands, through the harbor area, and
across the bed of the river beyond the harbor lines, but the court dealt
only with the tidelands and the harbor areas.' 55 The court concluded
that the Washington Constitution did not preclude the railroad corpo-
ration from acquiring the right from the state to cross the harbor area.
A Washington Attorney General's opinion on the legality of leasing
the beds of navigable waters for oil exploration concludes that it is le-
gal because (1) the intent of the framers of the Washington Constitu-
tion was to protect marine commerce, not to stifle other activities and
(2) the constitution prohibits granting rights to private persons in the
waters beyond the outer harbor line, not in the bed.156 If this
reasoning is correct, pipelines and cables, which merely occupy the
bed of the waterway, would be allowed by the constitution. Uses that
encumber the water column, such as bridge piers or some aqua-cul-
ture projects, would not be allowable because they require rights in
the waters, not just the beds, and because they could interfere with
marine commerce. The court said in Chlopeck Fish Co. v. City of
Seattle,157 however, that the prohibition against granting rights in wa-
153. R.C.W. § 79.16.530 allows the abutting upland owner or the lessee of the abut-
ting tidelands to lease the beds of navigable waters below the line of extreme low tide.
WASH. REV. CODE § 79.16.530 (1976). Section 79.01.384 allows a right of way across
beds of navigable waters to be granted to "any municipal or private corporation, com-
pany, association, [or] individual" for construction of "any telephone line, ditch, flume
or pipeline for the domestic water supply of any municipal corporation or transmission
line for the purpose of generating or transmitting electricity for light, heat or power."
Id. § 79.01.384. Section 79.01.568 authorizes leasing of the "beds of all navigable tidal
waters in this state lying below extreme low tide not in front of any incorporated city or
town, nor within two miles on either side thereof" for cultivation of oysters, clams, or
other edible shellfish. Id. § 79.01,568.
154. 54 Wash. 530, 103 P. 809 (1909).
155. Id. This provision was mentioned by the court again in 1911 in Chlopeck Fish
Co. v. City of Seattle, where the court said, "It will be noted in this connection that the
prohibition found in the first clause of this sentence against the sale, gift or lease of any
rights whatever in the waters beyond the harbor lines is applied to private persons, cor-
porations or associations only." Chlopeck Fish Co. v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 315,
323-24, 117 P. 232, 235 (1911) (emphasis in original).
156. 1963 OP. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. No. 46 at 3-4 (1963).
157. 64Wash. 315, 117 P. 232(1911).
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ters beyond the harbor lines applies only to private persons.158 A lease
for a bridge pier or other use encumbering the water column granted
to a public corporation would not violate the constitution. 159 Thus,
granting any rights to a private person or corporation in the waters
beyond the outer harbor line appears to be at least a technical viola-
tion of the Washington Constitution. A grant which concerns merely
the bed of navigable waters, or a grant to a public entity would not vi-
olate the constitution.
F. Moving Harbor Lines
As originally adopted, article XV spoke only of establishing harbor
lines; it made no provision for moving or disestablishing harbor
lines. 160 The Washington Supreme Court in 1895, in Wilson v. State
Land Commissioners,'6' held that the only way to disestablish harbor
lines was through a constitutional amendment. In 1932, article XV
was amended to provide that "[a] ny harbor line so located or estab-
lished may thereafter be changed, relocated or reestablished by the
commission pursuant to such provision as may be made therefor by
the legislature."'1 62
The legislature has authorized relocation in various ways. It has di-
rected the Harbor Line Commission to make a specific change in a
specific harbor line.' 63 It has authorized the approval of a tideland re-
plat that would change harbor lines,' 64 and generally authorized
changing inner harbor lines whenever they fall "inside of the govern-
ment meander line, or for any other good cause.' 65 The legislature
has also passed a law authorizing the Commission to relocate harbor
lines in front of specified cities.' 66 Additional sites are frequently
specified by the legislature. 67 The DNR construes this to be continu-
ing authorization to change inner and outer harbor lines in front of
158. Id. at 323-24, 117 P. at 235.
159. R.C.W. § 79.01.372 provides that counties, cities, towns, and other municipali-
ties have the right to construct bridges and trestles across waterways. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 79.01.372 (1976).
160. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (1889, amended 1932).
161. 13 Wash. 65, 42 P. 524 (1895).
162. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (1889, amended 1932, amend. 15).
163. Harbor Lines Act, ch. 24, § 2, vol. 2, 1967 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1513 (1967).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.16.325 (1976).
165. Id. § 79.01.424.
166. Harbor Lines Act, ch. 24, § 1, vol. 2, 1967 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1513 (1967).
167. The most recent version is Harbor Lines Comm'n Act, ch. 124, 1977 Wash.
Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 450 (1977).
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the named cities and not a one-time authorization. 168
1. Constraints on the movement of harbor lines
From the present language of article XV, it appears that when au-
thorized by the legislature, the Harbor Line Commission clearly has
the power to change harbor lines. The question remains, however, for
what reasons can these lines be changed and what guiding principles
must the Commission follow? The Washington Attorney General ad-
dressed those questions in a 1976 opinion discussing how the law al-
lowing the Commission to change harbor lines in front of specified
cities 169 applies to the harbor lines in Elliott Bay in front of the City
of Seattle. 170 The Attorney General noted that the legislature had not
set out any guidelines for relocating harbor lines. However, because
the constitution entrusted this function directly to the Harbor Line
Commission, it is an administrative, not a legislative function, and no
legislative guidelines are required.17' The Attorney General con-
cluded that the Commission must, when changing harbor lines, act
within the same constitutional constraints which apply to the estab-
lishment of new harbor areas. Therefore, the harbor area resulting
after a movement of harbor lines must still have a width of between
50 to 2000 feet and be located over state-owned land. 72
The Attorney General also set two additional guidelines for the
Commission. First, because article XV was intended to maintain vi-
able harbor areas in front of cities and to preserve state ownership of
harbor areas, changes in harbor lines may not destroy the "viability"
168. 1976 Op. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. No. 62 (1976) (letter opinion) (complete opinion
on file with Washington lUw Review) [hereinafter cited as 1976 OPINION].
169. Act Authorizing Harbor Line Comm'n to Change Certain Harbor Lines, ch.
139, 1963 Wash. Laws 664 (1963). More cities were added to the list in 1977. Harbor
Lines Comm'n Act, ch. 124, 1977 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 450 (1977).
170. 1976 OPINION, supra note 168.
171. Id. at 6-7. It has been suggested by Doug Anderson that the Attorney Gen-
eral's interpretation that changing harbor lines, like establishing them, is an administra-
tive function, ignores the difference in the language providing for these two actions.
Briefly, Anderson's position is that the relocation function is a hybrid of legislative and
administrative functions, and should be subject to the standards doctrine, the purpose of
which is to provide a judicial means to prevent the administrative abuse of discretion.
Anderson argues that relocating harbor lines is similar to rezoning and therefore the
procedural safeguards required in rezone actions should also be required in harbor line
relocations. D. Anderson, The Pier 50-51 Harbor Line Relocation: A Case Study of Le-
gal Principles Limiting the Power of the Harbor Line Commission to Relocate Harbor
Lines 19-20 (1977) (unpublished seminar paper ia University of Washington Law Li-
brary).
172. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1. See 1976 OPINION, supra note 168, at 7.
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of the harbor area.173 Second, the Harbor Line Commission, like all
public agencies, must exercise its power in the public interest and not
for the gain of private parties.174 It also seems clear that harbor lines
may not be moved to facilitate private acquisition of the harbor
area.175
The Board of Natural Resources, acting as the Harbor Line Com-
mission, also has procedural guidelines to follow mandated by the
Washington Administrative Procedures Act 7 6 and the rules of prac-
tice and procedure for the Natural Resources Board. 77
2. Effects of movement of harbor lines
If an inner harbor line in tidal water is moved outward, 78 classifi-
173. 1976 OPINION, supra note 168, at 7.
174. Id. at8.
175. "The manifest purpose of this section [WASH. CONsT. art. XV, § 1] is to pre-
vent the control of the water front of cities from ever falling into private hands."
Chlopeck Fish Co. v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 315,323, 117 P. 232, 235 (1911).
176. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1976).
177. WASH. AD. CODE ch. 332-08 (1977).
178. An example of moving the inner harbor line seaward in order to avoid the con-
stitutional restraints placed on harbor areas is the Pier 50-51 harbor line relocation in
Seattle. In 1976 the Howard S. Wright Development Company requested the Board of
Natural Resources, acting as the Harbor Line Commission, to relocate the inner harbor
line seaward of Piers 50-51, so that their proposed development (a hotel-office-tower
complex) would be located on state-owned tidelands rather than in the harbor area.
Board of Natural Resources, Dep't of Natural Resources Resolution No. 218 (Novem-
ber 7, 1976) (on file with Washington Law Review). This relocation would allow the
company to obtain a 55 year tideland lease; a harbor area lease for such a development
could run no more than 20 years. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
The Board passed Resolution No. 218, relocating the inner harbor line beyond Piers
50 and 51. On its face, the resolution stated that the reason for moving the lines was to
assist the development by avoiding constitutional restrictions. It further noted that
"[p] roject financing is less difficult to obtain for improvements to be
placed on a tideland area covered by a long term state lease." Board of Natural Re-
sources, Dep't of Natural Resources Resolution No. 218, at 1 (November 7, 1976) (on
file with Washington Law Review). The resolution also stated that it was in the public
interest to change the line. Id. at 2.
On February 14, 1977 the Seattle Shorelines Coalition petitioned for a writ of cer-
tiorari, challenging the Commission's action. Seattle Shorelines Coalition v. Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, No. 824247 (King County Superior Court, filed Feb. 14,
1977). Among the grounds for challenging the relocations was the claim that it violated
the mandate of article XV that the harbor area be forever reserved for conveniences of
navigation and commerce, that the relocation was "arbitrary, capricious and unrelated
to the constitutional purposes for which the harbor lines are established," and that "it re-
linquished the state's right to control the harbor area." Affidavit of Plaintiff Benella
Caminetti in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Seattle Shorelines Coali-
tion v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 824247 (King County Superior Court,
filed Feb. 14, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review).
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cation of the area between the old and the new inner harbor line
changes from harbor area to first-class tidelands. 179 Because the har-
bor area would have been owned by the state, the newly created tide-
lands would also be owned by the state. The abutting tideland owner
would have no claim of ownership of the new tidelands because the
abutting tidelands would have been sold with the outer boundary de-
fined by metes and bounds. 180
The newly created tidelands would be subject to fewer restrictions
as tidelands than as harbor area. Fifty-five year leases would be avail-
able,181 rather than the thirty year constitutional limit on harbor
areas, and the constitutional reservation for "conveniences of naviga-
tion and commerce"182 would not apply. The land would still be re-
served from sale to private parties, although the prohibition on the
sale of tidelands is merely a statutory restriction, 83 whereas the re-
striction on the sale of harbor areas is constitutional.184 It would be
more likely, therefore, that tidelands rather than harbor area would
eventually be sold because the sale could be authorized by statute.' 85
The tidelands would, however, still be subject to the Shorelines Man-
agement Act. 186
Resolution of this case on the merits could provide some guidelines for harbor area
relocations. However, it is likely that the case may not be decided on the merits, because
the Washington State Ferry System is interested in obtaining the site for terminal ex-
pansion, which would render the question moot.
The question raised in this case is whether moving a harbor line for the stated purpose
of avoiding constitutional restrictions is improper. Technically, once the harbor area is
moved outward, there are no restrictions on the former harbor. However, the purpose of
article XV is to preserve the harbor as a state-owned harbor area for conveniences of
navigation and commerce, and moving a line specifically to avoid this constitutional
purpose would be improper. Thus, it can be argued that the Pier 50-51 relocation was a
case in which the harbor line system was manipulated to benefit a private party, rather
than to protect the public interest.
179. The area between "the line of ordinary high tide and the inner harbor line" is
first-class tideland. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.020 (1976). See State ex rel. McKenzie v.
Forrest, I I Wash. 227, 39 P. 684 (1895).
180. Act Relating to State Lands and Their Management, ch. 36, 1911 Wash. Laws
129 (1911); Act Relating to the Public Lands of the State, ch. 178, § 15, 1895 Wash.
Laws 527 (1895).
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.470 (3) (1976).
182. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
183. WASH. REV. CODE 79.01.470(2) (1976). Before 1971, state-owned tidelands
could be, and often were, sold to the public. See note 64 supra.
184. WASH. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
185. A bill was introduced in the Washington State Legislature in January 1976
that would have authorized the sale of certain second-class tidelands to private parties.
H.B. 1427, 44th Legis., 2d Ex. Sess. (1976).
186. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1976).
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If the outer harbor line is moved outward, the area in which docks
and wharves can be built is increased. If a structure has been illegally
built beyond the outer harbor line, moving the line beyond the struc-
ture would bring the structure into compliance with article XV of the
constitution.187
Movement of an inner harbor line inward over state-owned tide-
lands increases the harbor area and the area between the old and new
inner harbor lines becomes subject to the restrictions placed on
harbor areas. The inner harbor line could not be moved inward over
privately owned tidelands without condemning the tidelands because
harbor areas must be state-owned. 188
Harbor lines have added significance in fresh water because the in-
ner harbor line is also the outer boundary of shorelands. 189 When
many shorelands were conveyed, the deed conveyed the state-owned
shoreland abutting the area.190 The outer boundary was not set. The
187. In Aberdeen, certain piers were built beyond the outer harbor line in the Che-
halis River. This is a violation of the constitutional mandate that no rights be granted in
the waters beyond the outer harbor line. Nothing was done about the situation until Oc-
tober 1977 when the Harbor Line Commission relocated the outer harbor line outside
the offending piers. Board of Natural Resources, Dep't of Natural Resources Resolu-
tion No. 227 (Oct. 18, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review). Although the
purpose of this was simply to remedy a technical violation of the constitution, it also
seems to further the constitutional purpose of preserving a viable state-owned harbor
area.
188. 1976 OPINION, supra note 168, at 7. In the early 1970's the City of Seattle be-
gan proceedings to condemn some West Seattle tidelands. In re Petition of Seattle to
Acquire by Condemnation Land and Other Property, No. 719531 (King County Supe-
rior Court, judgment entered Jan. 27, 1972). The tidelands between the high and low
tide lines were conveyed to a private party in 1900. In 1927, the Harbor Line Commis-
sion established an inner harbor line seaward of the line of low tide, and platted and
sold the newly created tidelands between the line of low tide and the inner harbor line.
In 1967, the legislature passed a law directing the Harbor Line Commission to relocate
the inner harbor line in the area in question to a location coincident with the existing
line of ordinary high tide. Act Relating to Harbor Lines, ch. 24, § 2, 1967 Wash. Laws
Ex. Sess. 1513 (1967). The Commission never passed a resolution so relocating the line.
The state was joined as a party in the condemnation proceedings. It asserted its rights
to the area up to high tide line, on the theory that the original conveyance was subject to
the state's power to later change the lines, and the state had changed them by passing the
statute noted above. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, In re Petition of
Seattle to Acquire by Condemnation Land and Other Property, No. 719531 (King
County Superior Court, judgment entered Jan. 27, 1972) (on file with Washington Law
Review).
189. Shorelands are defined as the land between the line of ordinary high tide and
the line of navigability. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.028, .032 (1976). When a harbor line
is established, this is the line of navigability, and therefore the outer boundary of the
shorelands. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 166, 135 P. 1035, 1038 (1913).
190. See, e.g., Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 130, 160 P. 310, 311 (1916);
State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 161, 135 P. 1035, 1036 (1913).
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Washington Supreme Court has held that what was conveyed was the
land out to navigable water.19' Theoretically, the line of navigability
is fixed, even though it is not legally described; the state is said to find
that line and define it when it establishes the inner harbor line. There-
fore, in practice, the grantee takes shorelands, subject to the right of
the state to establish the inner harbor line which is the boundary of
the shorelands. 192
The court has said that when this line of navigability is defined,
"the water boundary theretofore open would be forever settled."193
However, this holding was enunciated before the 1932 amendment to
article XV permitted the Harbor Line Commission to move harbor
lines if authorized to do so by the legislature. Thus, if the legislature
now authorizes the outward movement of the inner harbor line, and
the Harbor Line Commission so moves it, the privately owned shore-
land should expand because the harbor line is the outer boundary of
shoreland.194
If the inner harbor line in fresh water is moved outward, the newly
created shorelands would be owned by the owner of the preexisting
shorelands, whereas in tidal waters, the newly created tidelands are
not owned by the owner of the preexisting tidelands because that
owner had a set boundary to his tidelands. Moving the inner harbor
line outward would probably result in an increase of privately owned
shorelands. However, moving the harbor line inward would probably
raise a question of "taking" private property based on the owner's reli-
ance on a set boundary. l9 5
3. Eliminating harbor areas
Although the constitution as amended expressly allows harbor lines
191. State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
192. Id. at 166, 135 P. at 1038.
193. Id. at 168, 135 P. at 1038.
194. In State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913), the court discussed
the ownership of the shorelands created by the lowering of Lake Washington. It said that
in a case of a deed whose outer boundary was not set, but rather depended on physical
conditions, the deed carried title "to the line of navigability as it may be thereafter
fixed." Id. at 168, 135 P. at 1039. The value of ownership of shorelands is due to the fact
that it gives access to deep or navigable waters. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037. Therefore,
ownership must be extended to the line of navigability.
195. A discussion of the taking issue is beyond the scope of this article. For a discus-
sion of the taking issue, see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971); Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a
Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV.
315 (1979).
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to be "changed, relocated or re-established," 196 there appears to be no
authorization for totally eliminating a harbor area. If the Commission
wished to eliminate a harbor area, it could effectively accomplish this
goal by moving the area into deep water, beyond the area actually
used as the harbor. This would release the actual geographical harbor
area from the constitutional restrictions of article XV. It seems doubt-
ful, however, that, if challenged, the courts would permit such a trans-
parent excess of constitutional power. Such action would be contrary
to the two primary purposes of article XV, namely preserving harbor
areas and maintaining state ownership of them. 197
IV. SEATTLE CENTRAL WATERFRONT: A CASE IN
CONTROVERSY
The Seattle central waterfront controversy is the prime example of
the problems which can arise over harbor area uses. 198 The problems
196. WASH. CONsT. art. XV, § 1.
197. See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
198. In 1977, the Harbor Line Commission directed the DNR to establish a com-
mittee to review existing policies for the Seattle central waterfront and make recom-
mendations to the Commission. The committee membership consisted of representa-
tives from the DNR, the Port of Seattle, the City of Seattle, the League of Women
Voters, the Seattle Shoreline Coalition, and the Chamber of Commerce. Memorandum
from William A. Johnson, Chairman of Review Comm., Division of Marine Land Man-
agement, Dep't of Natural Resources to Harbor Line Comm'n (Mar. 23, 1978) (on file
with Washington Law Review).
Based on its meetings with former, existing, and potential users of the central water-
front, the DNR submitted findings and recommendations to the Commission in March
1978. The primary findings established that ships and shipping facilities have changed
with containerization, resulting in the need for 20 acres of backup space per ship, which
is not available on the central waterfront. Railroad service is inadequate and truck serv-
ice would "overtax roads and subject the public to unsafe conditions." The deep water
makes pier construction expensive. Nonconstitutional uses are not presently financially
feasible due to the short (10 and 20 year) lease terms allowed under the present policy.
However, the waterfront attracts people and there is a growing dominance of people-
oriented activity. Id. at 1-2.
The DNR offered four alternatives: (1) change the lease from 30 to 40 years or longer
through a constitutional amendment, (2) move the harbor lines out creating a less res-
trictive land use category, first-class tideland, (3) change the DNR policy to allow 30
year lease terms for nonconstitutional uses, (4) make no changes. Id. at 2.
The Port of Seattle supports the longer lease term for nonconstitutional uses because
it has no interest in developing facilities for shipping and navigation on the central Seat-
tle waterfront. Port of Seattle, Position Paper for Seattle Central Waterfront Harbor
Area Review Comm. (undated) (on file with Washington Law Review).
The Seattle Shorelines Coalition and the League of Women Voters both support use
of the waterfront for navigation and commerce, and suggested some "futuristic uses"
for the area. Seattle Shorelines Coalition, Report to the Central Waterfront Use Comm.
(Oct. 27, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review); Irene Christy, League of Women
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are exacerbated by public disagreement over what uses are beneficial
to the community, and by the incompleteness of the supreme court's
explication of what uses are allowable under article XV.
As discussed above, the Washington court has not clearly defined
what are "conveniences of navigation and commerce." The DNR says
that uses in Groups III, low priority water dependent uses, and IV,
uses which do not require waterfront location, are not constitutional
uses. 199 It is clear that under the DNR standards many uses in the
Seattle harbor area along the central waterfront, such as restaurants,
shops, parking garages, and the Seattle Aquarium,200 are not constitu-
tional. The Seattle Shoreline Master Program20' is also not fully in ac-
cord with other aspects of the constitutional reservation of harbor
areas for conveniences of navigation and commerce. Under Seattle's
Shoreline Use Goals and Policies, uses are listed in preferred order.
Voters of Washington, Statement to Seattle Central Waterfront Comm. (Oct. 27, 1977)
(on file with Washington Law Review).
In January 1979, the committee proposed to the Harbor Line Commission that the
Harbor Area Land Use Management Classifications be changed to allow the granting of
30 year leases for uses in Groups III and IV. This was not adopted at the January meet-
ing because of concern that this proposal was too broad. A hearing was held to obtain
public imput on the possible changes. Telephone conversation with William A. Johnson.
Supervisor, Division of Marine Land Management, Dep't of Natural Resources (Feb.
21, 1979) (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
In February 1979, two resolutions presented by the DNR were passed by the Board of
Natural Resources acting as the Harbor Line Commission. Resolution No. 249 added a
new class of harbor area to existing harbor area classifications. This allows creation of a
"Commercial Waterfront" area in which the DNR could grant 30 year leases for uses
not related to navigation and commerce. A "Commercial Waterfront" area can be es-
tablished on an urban waterfront if (1) adequate harbor areas are available to meet the
state needs of navigation and commerce for the succeeding 40 years and (2) the designa-
tion will foster accomplishment of the needs of the local community. Board of Natural
Resources, Dep't of Natural Resources, Resolution No. 249 (Feb. 6, 1979) (on file with
Washington Law Review).
The Harbor Line Commission also passed Resolution No. 250 which placed the Seat-
tle central waterfront (from Piers 48 to 70 inclusive) in the new "Commercial
Waterfront" category thus allowing the granting of 30 year leases for uses not related to
navigation and commerce. Board of Natural Resources, Dep't of Natural Resources,
Resolution No. 250 (Feb. 6, 1979) (on file with Washington Law Review).
199. The DNR use classification system is discussed in the text accompanying notes
104-08 supra. The DNR policy states that Group III uses are allowed if the area is not
needed or suitable for constitutional uses thus implying that Group III uses are noncon-
stitutional. The policy directly states the Group IV uses are those that "clearly do not
conform to the purpose for which harbor areas are created." Dep't of Natural Resources
Harbor Area Land Use Management Classifications (Dec. 19, 1972) (on file with Wash-
ington Law Review).
200. See PORT OF SEATTLE, PORT OF SEATTLE HANDBOOK 1978, at 41 (1978).
201. SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, SEATTLE SHORELINE MASTER PROGRAM (1976) (ap-
proved by the Washington Dep't of Ecology, Oct. 8, 1976).
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Top priority is given to "[p] rotection and enhancement of natural
areas or systems-those identified as containing or having unique
geological, ecological or biological significance. °20 2 This is obviously
not compatible with reservation of the area for conveniences of navi-
gation and commerce. However, because there are few, if any, unique
natural areas along the Seattle central waterfront or in other Seattle
harbor areas, this may be only a technical conflict with the constitu-
tional system. Water-dependent uses are the second preferred use.203
However, these are defined to include recreational uses such as parks
and bike trails.204 Recreational uses are not normally considered con-
veniences of navigation and commerce. In the DNR use classification,
recreational uses fall into Group II1,205 which are considered to be
nonconstitutional uses.
There are also special goals for the central waterfront, some of
which are compatible with the constitutional reservation and some of
which are not. The first goal is to "[r] einforce the historic-marine ori-
entation of Seattle as a major downtown theme. '206 In most instances,
activities under this goal would be related to commerce and naviga-
tion and thus would be constitutional. The second goal is to
"[s] trengthen water-oriented recreation tourist activity, related retail
business, and public areas open to the water. o207 Many uses in this
group would be nonconstitutional, such as parks, restaurants, retail
stores and convention centers. The third goal, to "[m] aintain a full
complement of water dependent uses," 208 suggests activities more
closely related to navigation and commerce and probably within the
constitutional uses. The fourth goal, to "[p] reserve and enhance
views of Elliott Bay and the Olympic Mountains," 209 suggests activi-
ties only remotely related if at all, to navigation and commerce. The
permissibility of the nonconstitutional uses is contingent on the main-
tenance of sufficient area in the Seattle harbor dedicated to the needs
of navigation and commerce. If the plan does not provide this, a more
fundamental issue must be addressed: taking into consideration the
needs of the city, the needs of modern shipping, and the desires of the
202. Id. at ix.
203. Id.
204. Id. at ix, 60, 61.
205. See note 106 supra.
206. SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, SEATTLE SHORELINE MASTER PROGRAM 6 (1976) (ap-
proved by the Washington Dep't of Ecology, Oct. 8, 1976).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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people,210 should conveniences of navigation and commerce continue
to have preference over other uses on the Seattle central waterfront?
210. The Seattle Shoreline Master Program, id., and the report of the Seattle 2000
Commission, GOALS STATEMENTS FROM TASK FORCES OF THE SEATTLE 2000
COMMISSION (May 19, 1973), contain many expressions of the people's desires.
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